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I 
THE BANKRUPTCY OF WAGE THEORIES: 
PROLEGOMENA TO A POWER THEORY 
OF ECONOMY 
It needs no special demonstration that pure economics is 
an economic theory which excludes the influences of social 
power from the sphere of its construction. It is based on 
the hypothesis that each subject of social economy functions 
as an individual computing machine of utility giving no 
consideration to any relations of power. 
I have elsewhere demonstrated that t he centre of econo· 
mic theories lies in the explanation of prices and that the 
problem of wages occupies the basic position in such theories. 
Now, how far, we may ask, have economic theories, especial· 
ly those of pure economics, succeeded in clarifying this pro· 
blem ? In other words, have wage theories, based on the 
hypothesis of utility economy (in the sense of an economy in 
which social powers have no influence in the determination 
of prices), succeeded in explaining the variation of wages? 
I shall give an answer to this query at the outset: wage 
theories have been absolutely incapable of explaining wages 
as a reality. The present·day wage theories, and incidentally 
economic theories, require revision from this view-point. 
The essence of the needed revision consists in replacing 
utility economy by power economy (an economy in which 
social power operates in determining prices) as hypothesis. 
I am convinced the facts have thrown discredit upon 
the existing wage theories. I shall explain why I dare to 
make this contention. First, I shaH take up the conclusions 
drawn from the existing economic theories regarding the 
movement and height of wages in the recent times of econo· 
mic depression, and then compare these conclusions with 
economic realities. I wish to know if there is complete 
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agreement between them. Again, supposing there are some 
discrepancies between them, I wish to know if they can be 
explained from the existing economic theories themselves by 
introducing some new factor. 
II. 
The prevailing form of economic theory is, at present, 
the theory of marginal productivity, the content of which 
may be summarised as follows. To use the common expres-
sion, wages are determined by the marginal productivity of 
labour. To speak strictly, in taking into consideration the 
relations of general equilibrium, wages settle at the produc-
tivity of the final unit of labour. Regarding this there are 
two points I wish to elucidate here. 
(1) It should be noted that the marginal productivity of 
labour, which is equal with wage-rate in static state, is not 
the total value of products which depend on the labour unit. 
For, making an addition to the last unit of labour, there is 
a corresponding portion to be added for the use of capital, 
that is, the last increment of capital to buy the marginal 
labour. Thus, it is necessary that interest on that portion of 
capital, as well as wages, must be paid out of the value of 
products dependending on the marginal unit of labour. Wage 
rate must thus be equal with discounted marginal producti· 
vity, whi~h is nothing else than the essence of Taussig's 
theory of wages. According to my own view, this is only a 
special case of the general principle that the price of a factor 
of production is equal with the residual marginal productivity, 
or, to use the Marshallian expression, with the net produc· 
tivity, which means the value of product of the last incre· 
ment of that factor minus the price of the corresponding 
portion of other cO'operating factors which must be combined 
with it in production. 
(2) This final unit should be taken as the final unit of 
labour in so far as it is supplied in society. A more detailed 
explanation of this statement will perhaps clarify the doubt-
mE BANKRUPTCY OF WAGE THEORIES 19 
iul points involved. The number of labourers existing at a 
given time must. be taken as the amount of labour supply at 
that moment, so long as typical labourers cannot live without 
selling their labour to get their daily necessaries (when we 
can abstract the labour hours per day in considering the 
quantity of labour), so that labourers cannot have the liberty 
to seIl or not seIl their labour. 
It is the premise of the theory of marginal productivity 
that the demand of industrialists for labour is determined by 
the productivity of labour. So long as workers are placed 
in circumstances in whi!=h they must seIl their labour for the 
means of living, they occupy a position in which they must 
supply labour at whatever price may be offered and have no 
liberty of deciding to seIl or not to seIl their labour. In· 
dustrialists offer them wages corresponding to marginal pro-
ductivity. In other words, industrialists demand their labour 
at that demand price. 
And this demand price must determine the height of 
wages in so far as every unit must be sold at the demand 
price for marginal unit. The marginal unit, the productivity 
of which is equal to wages, must be the marginal unit of 
labour at a given time. When this point is considered, Paul 
H. Douglas's explanation given to the nature of the theory 
of marginal productivity must be full of significance. Ac· 
cording to his views, the theory of marginal productivity is 
based on the premise that all labour has been used up, and 
that no part of it remains unemployed. The theory fits only 
in such a state of equilibrium. I wish to make the follow-
ing addition to the explanation of this theory. If industry 
is demanding labour at the demand price determined by the 
marginal productivity of labour in so far as actuaIly employed 
at a given time, then the wages concerned cannot be stable. 
Such wages will be reduced sooner or later through the 
competition of labourers outside the margin, or unemployed 
workers. This competition wiIl cease only after all workers 
have secured work. 
Gustav Cassel, in his equation of general equilibrium, 
,. 
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regards the total supply of productive goods as equivalent to 
its existing amount. With regard to labour, which we are 
here considering, he is not without a reason in view of the 
circumstances we have noted above. Of course, there are 
some who insist that the supply function of labour must be 
taken into consideration and who recognize that the amount 
of labour supply varies according to supply prices. But even 
from this standpoint, there will be no need of revising the 
statement I have made above. Now, what is it that deter-
mines supply prices in the supply function of labour? It 
must be the loss of utility consequent on the supply of labour, 
so long as utility economy is accepted as one of the premises. 
But for the labourers of the prevailing type who earn a 
living by the supply of their labour, this los~ of utility in 
general is necessarily insignificant compared with the utility 
of wages they are capable of securing (however small the 
wages may be) in consideration of the operation of the so-
called .. instinct of workmanship". For this reason, even 
supposing that the amount of labour supply is the function 
of prices, that amount in equilibrium will be practically the 
same as the total amount of existing labour, and the marginal 
unit of labour supply may be regarded as the marginal unit 
of the total amount of existing labour. 
I shall go on with my discussion on the assumption that 
the content of the theory of the marginal productivity of 
labour is as I have above explained. 
What is the nature of the condition of wages during the 
post-bellum depressions, especially the heaviest depression 
which began in 1929? The rate of unemployment was un-
precedentedly high. Let us see what were the relations be-
tween wages and the marginal productivity of labour during 
this period. (1) Many industrial enterprises continued their 
operation despite their losses. Viewed from this fact, wages 
were much larger than the marginal productivity of employ· 
ed labour (or the productivity of labourers excluding the un· 
employed). (2) We have already seen that the marginal pro-
ductivity at which wages are to settle must be the produc· 
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tivity of the marginal unit which will be determined when 
the available volume of labour is wholly employed, that is, 
without any remaining part. But we now know that the 
marginal productivity in this original meaning, or the sup· 
posed marginal productivity of all labour including the un· 
employed, is much smaller than the marginal productivity of 
the former (i.e., the labourers excluding the unemployed). 
What are the conclusions we can draw from the facts 
under examination? We have learned that wages do not 
settle at the marginal productivity of the existing labour, and, 
further, that they do not settle even at the marginal productivi· 
ty of employed labour, so that they were higher than either of 
these during the period of this depression. True, depression 
does not mean a static state, and one may indeed say that 
it . is only too natural that wages do not correspond to the 
marginal productivity of labour during a period of depression. 
But this static economic law is based on the premise that 
industrialists demand labour at the marginal productivity 
point, so that wages tend to approach it. But no such ten· 
dency was shown in the wages paid during the years of de· 
pression. Wages were always above the marginal productivity 
of employed labour (this means that marginal enterprises 
continue their business at a loss) and failed to correspond to 
it. In consequence, wages are always far above the marginal 
productivity of the existing labour. Nor is this all, Real 
wages rose somewhat in actuality, although the theory under 
examination contends that when unemployment increases and 
consequently marginal productivity decreases, unemployed 
workers will necessarily engage in a keen competition by 
reducing wages. All of these facts are in direct opposition 
to the stand taken by the theory of marginal productivity. 
Wages were much higher than marginal productivity during 
the recent period of depression, while they failed to show a 
tendency to approach in their movement the underlying level 
of marginal productivity, rather tending to rise despite the 
increase of unemployment. All these are inconsistent with 
the contention of the theorY of marginal productivity. Nor 
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is it possible to find anything within the theory explaining 
all this. 
III. 
I shall now make some observations regarding facts in 
connection with what I have so far stated. During the 
post-bellum depressions, wages were always above the margi-
nal productivity of employed labour. This is clear from the 
fact that many inferior enterprises went bankrupt and had 
to suspend their production. By the productivity of labour 
here is meant residual productivity or net productivity, that 
is, nothing else than the value of products minus costs in 
other co·operating productive goods. It needs no demonstra-
tion that this cost includes interest at comparatively high 
rates, due to long term contracts, as weli as the wear and 
tear expenses of equipment installed when prices were high. 
In fact, the wages which an enterprise can rationally pay 
cannot be beyond the marginal productivity in this sense, 
which is necessarily cut down by the costs in the other items. 
Not only were wages higher than marginal productivity 
to such an extent that they forced some industrial enterprises 
either to go bankrupt or to curtail their production, but also, 
the difference between wages and marginal productivity did 
not show the tendency to be eliminated. Of course, wages 
mere reduced nominally, and in many cases substantially too, 
to some extent, but notwithstanding the rate of unemploy-
ment increased year after year, and the curtailment of pro-
duction also steadily increased. These facts indicate that the 
difference between wages and marginal productivity was not 
eliminated in spite of wage reduction. This is also indicated 
by the fact that in considering means for eliminating unem-
ployment, the contention is vigorously made that high wages 
are largely responsible for unemployment and that, if they 
are reduced, one of the principal causes of unemployment 
will be eliminated. 
---~~~-~.-~~-.. _--
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Rates of Unemployment in Variou. Counbicli 
Year United States I Germany Great Britain 
1929 
I 
8.3 I - *8.2 
1930 15.1 
1 - 11.8 
1931 ! 19.3 I 23.7 16.9 1932 24.1 30.1 17.6 
I 1933 24.0 25.8 16.4 1934 (al *22.6 (Jan.) 15.3 (Jan.) *13.9 I 




Wages in Various Countries (1929 as Basfe Year) 
Note: A for nominal wage, B for real wage, 









Year United States Germany _li<eat Britain France Japan 
19271 
A B C D A B A B A B B lMlnll!l1 
97 95 97 96 87 91 102 100 91 
-
105 
1928 I 98 97 98 98 95 96 100 99 90 - 104 
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 99 
1930 91 94 89 90 102 106 100 104 108 100 91 
1931 79 92 77 79 97 109 98 109 104 99 88 
1932 60 77 60 60 82 104 96 110 96 98 89 
1933 62 83 62 61 79 104 95 112 95 101 -
1934 72 92 70 69 79 102 96 III - - -
~Ia'!'.) ( .. J I .. ) ( .. ) 
(a) Statistical Year-Book of the League of Nations, 1933/34. 
(b) Figures marked * are taken from International Labour Review, Vol. 
xxxn, No.3. 
The fact that an enterprise reduces its production and 
discharges some of its workers reveals that the marginal 
productivity of the labour employed is less than wages. 
Viewed from the stand·point of the theory of marginal pro-
ductivity, under such a circumstance there will be competi· 
tion from unemployed workers leading to a reduction of the 
supply prices of labour, and this is bound to result in are· 
duction of actual wages. But let us see what are the actual 
facts in connection with this matter. Let us take the facts 
during 1931. In the United States, the unemployment rate 
.. _---- -- -------------- ~ 
---_._-._. '----
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was twice that of 1929 but the reduction in real wages was 
only eight per cent. In Germany the unemployment rate 
was twenty·four per cent., and wages increased by nine per 
cent. during this period. In England, the unemployment rate 
doubled as compared with that in 1929, but real wages in· 
creased also by nine per cent. Thus, many facts point to 
a . tendency exactly opposite to what the theory of marginal 
productivity teaches. 
The foregoing facts indicate that wages were higher than 
the marginal productivity of employed labour. And this is 
not all: the marginal productivity of existing labour, 
including unemployed, to which wages are expected to 
approach and to be bound to settle there, according to the 
theory of marginal productivity, must have been still lower. 
There is no certain way of ascertaining this marginal pro· 
ductivity in the latter case (or the productivity of the last 
labourers when all labourers would have secured work, 
including the unemployed). But there are some references 
that we. may use as materials in supposing it. 
According to the conclusions reached by Paul H. Douglas 
from economic facts in the United States, labour (L) and pro· 
ductive capital CC) are in the relations shown in equation A 
as regards their respective productivity (P). Since the index 
of L in that equation is about 0.75, so far as it is treated 
within the given sphere of materials, the formula A will take 
the form like Bll 
P= L" C'-" ...... ···CAl: P=L-" C·" ........ (Bl. 
The above formula shows the following. If capital is 
regarded as a constant amount, 1 per cent. increase of labour 
supply effects 0.75 per cent. increase in the total amount of 
physical products, and, at the same time, 0.25 per cent. de-
crease of the marginal productivity of labour. From this 
may be derived the conclusion that the elasticity of labour 
demand is -4. Collateral evidence of this conclusion may be 
1) Paul H. Douglas, The Theory of Wages, 1934 . 
.. - - -_ •. -_ •..•.... _- - ---
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found in Pigou's contention that the elasticity of labour de· 
mand is -3 and also in the fact the total amount of the 
wages paid to the industrial workers in the United States in 
1909 or 1918 is 75 per cent. of the total value of products 
(However, the percentage after the world depression is said 
to swing around 65 per cent). Now, let us adopt this formula 
as our main premise and make several suppositions. In the 
first place, let us suppose that when the relation between 
the variations of productive factors and the corresponding 
change in productivity when the former is only one per cent. 
is equally existent in the case when the increase or decrease 
of labour is between 10 and 20 per cent .. and also that the 
existence of idle equipment which will be brought into action 
with the increase of labour in employment can be abstracted. 
Under such supposed conditions, the decrease in the marginal 
productivity of labour, owing to the taking into employment 
of all unemployed, will be about 6 per cent. Thus, it may 
be said without any doubt that wages are much higher than 
the marginal productivity of the labour employed, and still 
higher than the marginal productivity of the existing labour 
force, which is six per cent. lower than the former. 
There is no doubt that the function of trade unions is 
partly responsible for the fact that wages have always been 
higher than the marginal productivity of labour. It is clear 
that this has been especially and remarkably so in the case 
of England. But the following condition must be taken into 
consideration in a theoretical discussion of this effect of 
labour unions on wages. Though a large number of workers 
are organized into trade unions for the purpose of securing 
a monopolistic position in the labour market, they always 
face (1) some non·organised workers and (2) the attempt 
made by the unemployed workers to sell their labour at a 
price which is much lower than the prevailing rate, that is, 
the present wage, when there is a high rate of unemploy· 
ment. This conclusion is inevitable so long as one takes 
utility economy as the major premise and stands on the 
ground of the theory of marginal utility. Industrial enter· 
I 
______ 1 
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prisers will also attempt to reduce their losses by employing 
workers out of work at cheaper wages. Thus, there will be 
unemployment within the members of a labour union. Of 
course, labour unions may adopt the policy of preventing un· 
employment for their members through organized resistance, 
but so far they have not succeeded in such a policy in any 
country. When some members of a labour union have joined 
the camp of the unemployed, they will be forced to enter 
into competition leading to wage reduction. So long as there 
exist the two factors of non·union workers and unemploy· 
ment, the function of a monopolistic power to place wages 
above productivity will not be theoretically effective. Viewed 
from the premise of utility economy, there should be a down· 
ward movement of wages towards marginal productivity. 
This can be said even as regards England, where the 
trade union movement is highly developed. But let us take 
our own case in Japan. The labour union movement here 
is still in its infancy, and one cannot even dream of a mono· 
poly of labour supply by unions. The fact remains, however, 
that wages during a period of depression were above the 
marginal productivity of labour. Let us now study facts in 
the United States. The population returns of that country 
for the year 1930, classified according to vocations, show that 
the number of male workers above ten years of age employed 
in industries and mines was roughly 13,177,000. From this 
number are deducted those between the ages of 10-19 
according to the ratio of age composition of the general 
population, and this leaves a figure of 8,828,000." There 
may be some above the age of 20 who should also be ex· 
cluded, but since there are women workers who should be 
included, we may take 8,800,000 as approximately correct. 
Let us compare this number with the number of union 
workers .. In 1927, there were 4,241,542 union workers belong· 
ing to various organizations. In 1930, those belonging to the 
American Federation of Labour alone numbered 2,961,096. 
2) Statistical Year-Book of the League of Nations, 1933/34, p. 26, 39. 
THE BANKRUPTCY OF WAGE THEORIES 27 
The total number of industrial workers in 1929 was 8,785.600. 
""hile in 1934 it was 6,600,100. The total number of indust· 
rial workers in England in 1929 was 10,223,000" while in 
1934 it was 10,139,000. In 1928, there were 4,673,114" 
labour union workers in that country. The foregoing figures 
indicate that even in England, the number of unorganized 
workers cannot be ignored. 
Under the circumstances described above, so long as 
utility economy is accepted as true, wages should drop rapidly 
to the marginal productivity of at least employed workers 
and thereby suspend the curtailment or bankruptcy of in· 
dustrial enterprises and the increase of unemployment. As 
a matter of fact, however. all such unfortunate economic 
phenomena continued their trend. This reveals the impotency 
of the marginal productivity theory in explaining the variation 
of wages, although the monopoly of labour through the 
medium of trade unionism in England and other countries 
must be taken in to consideration. Nor is this all. Despite 
the increases of unemployment. real wages have often in· 
creased. This cannot be explained by the theory of marginal 
productivity nor, for that matter, by the theory of supply 
and demand on which the former is founded. 
IV. 
The supporters of the theory of marginal productivity 
attempt to explain the foregoing facts by introducing other 
circumstances. But they can never succeed in their attempt 
so long as they take into consideration circumstances other 
than social power-in other words, unless they adopt the 
new premise of power economy. 
Let us examine this matter in reference to the argument 
of J. R. Hicks. BY introducing some new factors, he tries 
to explain that during the period of world depression, wages 
in England rose despite the increase of unemployment. His 
3) International Labour Review, September 1935, p. 409. 
4) Handbook of Labour Statistics, 1931, p. 397. 
------ -----. -.. _- -------- - ------- -----.-
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contention in the main may be summarized as follows. 
While an enterprise uses circulating capital, during such 
a period of depression it suffers a loss. But when the 
capital is deposited with a bank, some gain is derived from 
the interest thereon. For this reason, if wages do not drop. 
it is more. profitable for an industry to curtail its production 
and discharge part of its working force. However, there is 
a difficulty in re'employing the discharged workers when they 
are wanted on some future occasion. Because of this difficul· 
ty, an industrial enterpriser retains, even at a loss, some of 
the more useful workers for future use. Moreover, those 
who are in supplementary relations with them will be also 
retained, and thus an attempt is made to keep the loss at a 
mlmmum. An industrial enterpriser refrains from reducing 
the wages of his workers to the extent that he wants to reo 
tain them. 
Let us examine whether Hicks's contention holds water. 
He contends that an enterprise refrains from reducing the 
wages of its workers because it wants to retain the useful 
workers for future service. But if this be true, there would 
be no obstacles in the way of the reduction of the wages of 
unskilled workers, who may be hired at any time because 
of the abundance of their supply. But the statistics we have 
reviewed show that in the United States, during the period 
of depression between 1929 and 1932, the wages of unskilled 
workers were relatively higher than those of skilled workers. 
If employers were unable to reduce wages because of their 
wish to retain the skilled workers for the following revival 
period, as contended by Hicks, only their wages would be 
maintained at a comparatively high level, and those of un-
skilled workers, whom it is not necessary for enterpreneurs 
to retain, and whom they may employ whenever they want, 
would be greatly lowered. Hicks's theory is only a paper 
theory, so to speak, since it is contradicted by actual facts. 
His argument that it is difficult for an employer to re-hire skill-
ed workers discharged during a period of business depression 
is groundless. Those workers who are discharged in a time 
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of depression will have no other way than to await opportuni· 
ties for employment as unemployed workers. Their labour 
is always for sale. They will supply it any time upon the 
recovery of business if they are paid suitable wages.') Hicks 
further says that even when depression is intensified, thus 
necessitating wage reduction, employers will not reduce 
wages down to the subsistence level, because if they do, 
they will not be able to secure the needed labour supply 
even when they offer good wages during a period of pro· 
sperity. Why? Because the employers would have disrepute 
on acount of their drastic reduction of wages. It is argued 
that such employers would not be able to secure a labour 
supply even if they were to pay good wages because they 
would not offer security of employment to workers.') How· 
ever, it should be noted that even during a period of busi· 
ness prosperity, there is not any great scarcity of labour. 
There is some degree of unemployment, or the so·called 
normal unemployment at any time. It will be far from the 
consideration of employers to provide for the distant future, 
especially when they are placed at the parting of the ways 
between life and death at the depths of a world depression. 
Hicks's explanation only shows the difficulty of explaining the 
actual variation of wages from the theory of marginal pro· 
ductivity. His theory, in short, is no explanation of the 
given problem, being at most an admission of the impossi· 
bility of the required explanation. 
Compared with the theory of providing for prosperous 
future times, the explanation by means of the principle of 
inertia is far more rational. It is explained that once wages 
are fixed at certain rates, they do not become reduced be· 
cause of their inertia, even during a period of depression. 
Schumpeter points out how frequently this explanation has 
been employed by writers on wages." It may be stated that 
5) J. R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, 1932, p. 5-1 et seq. 
6) op. cit .. p. 53. 
7) Joseph Schumpeter. Verteilungslehre u. s. w. Archiv f. Sozialwissen-
",haft u. Soziaipolitik. Bd. 42. 
------ -------_ .. _-
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his criticism of the theory of inertia is not appropriate. Nor 
does the theory of inertia itself touch the core of the wage 
problem. He criticizes the theory of inertia something as 
follows. 
The assertion that present wages are determined by 
inertia amounts to the statement that present wages are chiefly 
affected by past wages; but the past wages themselves were 
in turn determined by the productivity of labour in the past. 
Therefore, to explain wages by means of inertia is the same 
as to explain them by means of the operation of the produc· 
tivity of labour. Now I wish to examine this criticism. To 
assert that past wages were determined by past productivity 
is only to clarify at what height inertia operates to stabilise 
wages, but such an assertion does not indicate the essence of 
inertia itself. Moreover, once the existence of inertia is ad· 
mitted, one cannot reasonably say that past wages were 
determined by the productivity of the past, and at the same 
time one will have to admit that past wages were, in their 
turn, determined by the inertia that has come down from the 
distant past. To resolve the determination of wages by iner· 
tia into the action of productivity is essentially an unreason· 
able process. Furthermore the action of the inertia of prices 
in the case of all kinds of finished products and produced 
productive goods also must be taken into account. The 
inertia of price in the case of these latter is very insign i· 
ficant and operates only for a short period of time so that 
it is soon overcome by the general tendency of supply and 
demand. Owing to such circumstances, the prices of other 
commodities than labour can drastically change in various 
ways, while real wages remain samewhat stable generally. 
This phenomenon, however, cannot be explained by means 
of productivity of labour. 
Can we then accept the explanation of wages by inertia 
as the theory is advanced by its exponents? I am inclined 
to believe that inertia, as the term is used in this explanation, 
is only an analogy which must be translated into a term 
having a social meaning. Inertia is nothing but resistance 
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against price variation, against its depreciation in the present 
case. Now, what is the nature of this resistance or obstacle ? 
It simply means that wages are determined by the relations 
of power. The prevailing wages correspond generally to 
relations of power or position. It may be said, therefore, 
that the requirement for a given wage is based on social 
position. In other words, the requirement regarding social 
position can be satisfied only by receiving a definite level of 
wages, so that it is difficult for the supply price of labour 
to drop below that niveau. Such is the very nature of inertia 
which is said to determine wages. 
v. 
Wage theories based upon the theory of marginal pro· 
ductivity, or when viewed from the broader standpoint of 
the premise of utility economy, are incapable of explaining 
not only the movement of the post-bellum wages but also 
wages at their heights. We shall analyse this point by tak-
ing up Schumpeter's theory. 
His wage theory only indicates from begining to end 
how theories of general equilibrium are incapable of explain-
ing the realities of wages_ It is in fact a theory which at· 
tempts to prove the impotency of wage theories. To begin 
with, theories of general equilibrium, and consequently wage 
theories (which are part of the theories of the prices of pro-
ductive goods) contained therein, are based upon the supposi-
tion that both demand and supply are penetrated thoroughly 
by the principle of value. Let us first consider supply. The 
children of government officials do not become wage·earners, 
while those of the working class remain in their own class. 
The sphere in which they may shift from one vocation to 
another is extremely limited. Industrial enterprisers, govern-
ment officials, artists and workers all become so by the force 
of circumstances and not by their voluntary choice. This 
means that labour supply is not ruled by the principle of 
value. In other words, those factors which determine the 
-----"-._-----------------_.,_.---- -,---------,--------, 
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distribution of labour among various occupations and pro· 
fessions are outside economic circumstance. s) The same truth 
may be found as regards labour demand. As to the demand 
for consumption goods and machinery, the best, or those 
having the highest capacity, are most urgently demanded, 
consequently at the highest demand prices. But this is not 
so as regards industrial enterprisers. Those who are the 
best fitted for industrial enterprises do not necessarily engage 
in such enterprises. On the contrary, only those having the 
capital necessary for industrial enterprise, as well as the 
social position and other qualifications, are able to become 
industrialists. The same thing may be said of government 
officials and professional men, Those who offer the most 
valuable service (who are engaged in work for which the 
highest reward is given - this is the writer's interpretation) 
are not necessarily endowed with the best abilities. Such 
persons are selected from among those having the required 
qualifications. Even the service of the highest class of go· 
vernment officials can be performed by the average ability 
of average men.9) In other words, the demand for labour is 
also not determined by the principal of value. In order 
that the calculation of value be inclusive and satisfactory, it 
is necessary that labour power be distributed from the view-
point of the value of service and that demand for service 
correspond to the function of value. Only in such a case 
will the value of each service be normal. But the foregoing 
requirements are not satisfied in actuality. 
The various groups of labourers stand out separately like 
so many islands, among which there is scarcely any means 
of communication. On each of the islands only the principle 
of value dominates. In other words, various labourers exist 
there in definite numbers and there is no shifting between 
the different groups.") The wage theory when revised as 
above fits the existing facts. The truth is that the principle 
8) Schumpeter. Wesen u. Hauptinhalt. p. 349. 
9) op, cit. p. 351. 
10) op. cit. p. 353 . 
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of value does not actually dominate when we take into can· 
sideration the whole sphere of labour.") 
To put the statement in a nutshell, this wage theory 
may be interpreted something as follows. The distribution 
of labour does not follow the principle of value, so that each 
worker performs his definite work or service after his definite 
social qualification or according to his definite social position. 
He is given wages corresponding to his service. I wish to 
offer a criticism of this view as follows. 
(1) The operation of extra·economic conditions affecting 
the distribution of labour is clearly explained by the theory, 
but I think that this circumstances must be treated as data 
for the theoretical construction. So long as the social reo 
strictions which determine the distribution of labour among 
various groups or occupations are presupposed as data, and so 
long as the quantity of each group of labour is regarded as 
fixed to some extent, can we then say that the above wage 
theory is harmonious with existing facts? According to 
Schumpeter, an affirmative answer must be given to this 
question. Industrial enterprisers get the highest income be· 
cause their service is the highest value, that is, of the highest 
utility, and government officials and professional men receive 
large incomes becaus3 their work is of high utility, apart 
from any question as to whether men of greater capacity or 
ability than they exist or not. But here is a matter which 
has been overlooked by Schumpeter. The kind of distributed 
work varies according to the class to which one belongs, and 
those belonging to a high social class gain the highest income, 
or in other words the price of their labour is high. This 
fact is recognized by him but the nature of the fact itself 
constitutes a question. If utility economy is taken as a pre· 
mise, the wage theory of pure economics must hold. High 
wages are the result of the high marginal utility of the ser· 
vice concerned. But there should be no parallel relationship 
as a predetermined harmony between the level of the value 
II) op. cit. P. 356. 
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or utility of a service and that of the social position of the 
persons who perform that service. If such a relationship 
exists, as Schumperter's thesis must presuppose, it cannot 
be explained without introducing a metaphysical factor 
such as Providence. Moreover, it is impossible to explain 
from such a standpoint the fact that the price of a certain 
kind of labour or the wage for some work remains high 
even when the value of the service has depreciated, that 
is, the utility of it has decreased. Inasmuch as the value 
of service is dominated by the principle of marginal utility, 
the value of the service in high professions must be very 
low, seeing that there are many persons who are quali· 
fied for the definite positions of government officials and 
company directors. Their salaries do not depreciate to any 
great extent even when marginal utility or marginal produc· 
tivity has become very small (especially when a rapid in· 
crease in unemployment among intellectuals is witnessed). 
This cannot be explained by the wage theory as described 
above. The truth is that the demand for wages, i.e., the 
supply price of labour, determines the marginal productivity 
or value of the labour employed. Contrary to Schum· 
peter's explanation, the productivity of service capable of 
paying the wage required is made possible and realised by the 
device or the method of production, which must be selected 
and adapted according to the supply prices of various kinds 
of labour. This treatment of the supply price of labour in 
terms of power economy can explain the parallel relation· 
ship between social position and wages, without introducing 
any metaphysical factor. 
(2) Not all of the questions raised by Schumpeter are 
dealt with by him and the remaining questions, not taken 
into the sphere of his explanation, show the inadequacy of 
his treatment. According to his interpretation, a coolie can 
never perform the functions of government officials or engi· 
neers, however excellent his ability may be, so that labour 
supply does not foHow the principle of value in this case. 
Nor does industry or society demand that government officials 
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or engineers be recruited from the class of manual labourers, 
but only from a definite class in society. Thus, the field of 
each kind of labour is an island by itself, and therein only 
the principle of value dominates. The wages of high·class 
labour are high because their value is high or their marginal 
utility is high. Against this statement, I have raised the 
question as to why the labour of the high class is high in 
value. To answer this question by means of predetermined 
harmony is not only metaphysical in treatment but highly 
inadequate. To show the latter point, that is, to show its 
inadequacy, I cite here the following facts. Wages for the 
same labour are different for men and for women workers. 
In the United States, wages differ for the same labour for 
White and for Chinese workers; in Southern France they 
differ for Frenchmen and for Italians for the same service. 
While all these are admitted as facts, Schumpeter does 
not give them any explanation at all. These phenomena can 
only be explained by the difference of supply prices due to 
different social positions, and this indicates the deep influence 
of the supply prices of labour in determining wages. For 
Schumpeter, the quantity of the various kinds of labour 
and their value functions are everything; and for this rea· 
son, the difference in wages between men and women workers 
and between Whites and Chinese should not exist so long as 
the work performed is of the same nature. 
The factor causing differentiation of wages between 
workers of different sex and different natioriality for the 
same service must operate in all cases. This factor is the 
supply price which is based upon social position. In princi· 
pie, the respective value of each kind of labour tends to 
follow its respective supply price so that the methods of 
production are selected according to the latter and when the 
methods of production so selected are not successful, a cor· 
rective change in supply price must take place to some ex· 
tent. For this reason, supply prices of labour are not merely 
a reflection of its value or productivity but indicate the level 
which the value, which will result from the productive process, 
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must attain. By such an interpretation alone can the 
differences of wages, as well as the maintenance of high 
wages despite unemployment, and, in short, all difficult 
questions concerning wages be explained. This is why I 
am convinced that wage theories should shift from the 
basis of utility economy to that of power econom y. 
YASUMA TAKATA 
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